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This is the first in a series of short articles we plan to write on the current crisis. Our 
aim in this series is threefold: to outline some of the important contours of the crisis; 
to situate these patterns in historical context; and to reflect on their possible causes 
and implications.  
Since the crisis is still ongoing, such analysis can only be cursory and suggestive. 
But it is nonetheless useful to put our preliminary research and thoughts in writing. 
By spelling out what we do know (or think we know) about the crisis, we can better 
identify what we don’t know and need to ask.  
This paper sets the stage for the series. It outlines the conventional wisdom about 
the cause of crisis; it describes the chronology of events; and it contrasts the pattern 
and magnitude of the current downturn with those of earlier episodes. The overall 
picture painted by this analysis is highly stylized: crises appear to come and go with 
remarkable regularity, their oscillations are fairly similar and they share the same 
order of magnitude. The whole process seems almost “automatic,” and automaticity 
is reassuring: it suggests that the current crisis has run much of its course and that 
doom and gloom will soon give way to a new upswing.  




Most observers like to blame the ongoing turbulence in the global political economy 
on finance – or more precisely, on a mismatch between finance and reality.  
The mismatch begins with the assumption that there are two types of capital: 
“real” and “financial.” Real capital is a productive entity, made of machines, struc-
tures, work in progress and (some say) knowledge. Financial capital is a symbolic 
entity, consisting of equity and debt claims on real capital. In a perfect world, the two 
types of capital are exactly equal: the dollar value of GE’s stocks, bonds and other 
outstanding obligations represents the productive value of the company’s capital 
stock, so the two magnitudes must be the same. The assets and the entitlements to 
the assets have to match, by definition. 
But the world isn’t perfect. Greed and fear, irrationality and fraud, corruption 
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tion and excessive deregulation, imperfect information and short-term memory, all 
conspire to distort the picture. These distortions cause finance to deviate from its 
“fair value,” either up or down. And as the deviation grows larger, finance ceases to 
mirror reality. It becomes a “fiction.” 
The current crisis, goes the argument, is the unavoidable consequence of such 
deviation. Since the 1980s, we are told, finance has inflated into a huge bubble, hav-
ing risen far above the underlying stocks of real assets. But then, whatever goes up 
must come down. Since finance, in the final analysis, is merely the image of the real 
thing, at some point it has to shrink back to its “true” size. And that is exactly what 
we are now witnessing: a violent financial crisis that dispels the fiction and brings 
finance down to its “par value.”  
  
The Excess Unwound 
 
According to the mismatch thesis, the current turmoil started in the U.S. housing 
market. This was the epicenter. From here the tremor spread like a tidal wave: first to 
the entire U.S. FIRE sector (an acronym for “finance, insurance and real estate”), 
then to every financial market around the world, and finally to the so-called “real 
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Figure 1 shows the rise and fall of U.S. house prices, along with the expansion 
and contraction of the FIRE sector. Prices of homes started to soar in 1997/8. Ac-
cording to the pundits, the blaze was fuelled by three key actors. The first was Fed 
Chairman and Ayn Rand acolyte Alan Greenspan, who lowered interest rates and in 
the belief that “human nature” would limit risk taking. The second were the financial 
institutions that gladly ignored the risks and went on to offer mortgages to anyone 
willing to borrow. And the third were the eyes-wide-shut regulators, who seemed 
unable to see what was going on even if they cared. House prices had nowhere to go 
but up, and within a decade they tripled. 
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Figure 1 
Houses on Fire 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Index**
(right)
 
* The FIRE sector comprises corporations that operate primar-
ily in finance, insurance and real estate. The last data point is 
for October 2008. 
 
** The S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Index measures average 
resale prices of single family homes in 10 metropolitan areas 
(Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, 
New York, San Diego, San Francisco and Washington DC). 
The original index is reported as a 3-month moving average. 
The last data point is for September 2008. 
 
SOURCE: Global Insight (series code: HPICSC10.M for the 
S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Index); Datastream (series 
code: FINANUS(MV) for the stock market capitalization of 
U.S. FIRE corporations). 
 
 
Everyone was bullish. Home buyers were eager to borrow, convinced that prices 
would go on rising and that their houses could always be resold at a profit. The 
bankers bent over backwards to lend them the money – and then melted the individ-
ual mortgages into large pools of asset-backed securities. And the so-called invest-
ment community – including “high net-worth individuals,” large corporations, 
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money managers and the banks themselves – lined up to buy tranches of the new 
“structured investment vehicles,” usually without asking too many questions. 
And for a while there was little to ask about. Since house prices were rising, de-
fault wasn’t an issue. A home owner who couldn’t service his mortgage would have 
his house repossessed and quickly resold to the next sucker in line, often at a higher 
price. And if the parties still felt that there was some residual risk left, they could al-
ways offset the hazard with higher interest rates, mortgage insurance and a whole 
slew of derivatives. The process seemed so robust that even “sub-prime” mortgages, 
lent to borrowers with little or no income, received a triple-A grading from honest-to-
god analysts and fail-proof rating agencies.1  
By the early 2000s, the real-estate boom went global. Worldwide, the annual is-
suance of asset-back securities rose nearly five-fold – from $532 billion in 2000 to 
$2.5 trillion in 2006 – with much of the expansion accounted for by mortgage-backed 
instruments, whose new issues rose from $275 billion in 2000 to over $2 trillion in 
2006. In the United States, repackaging reached record levels. By the early 2000s, 
over half of all single home mortgages and roughly one third of multifamily home 
mortgages were melted and resold as securities – up from 10 and 5%, respectively, in 
1980.2 
There was simply no way to lose money in this business, and the stock market 
certainly reflected that belief. The real-estate boom encouraged many other forms of 
debt financing, ranging from plain vanilla, to the exotic, to the kinky. And with U.S. 
FIRE companies cutting a profit on every deal, the total equity capitalization of their 
sector nearly quadrupled – from $1 trillion in 1997 to $3.7 trillion in 2007.  
And then the music stopped. 
As Figure 1 shows, in July 2006, U.S. house prices started to drop. Initially, in-
vestors hung in suspension. Pretending as if nothing had happened, they continued 
to buy FIRE stocks, pushing the market even higher. But the downward spiral in 
house prices persisted – and then, suddenly, in May 2007, everyone started rushing 
for the door. By September 2008, house prices were down nearly 25% relative to 
their 2006 peak, while U.S. FIRE stocks went into free fall. In October 2008, the to-
tal market capitalization of the sector was more than 50% below its May 2007 peak. 
                                                 
1 For a colorful description of the sub-prime lending and investment cycle, see Michael Lewis, 
“The End,” Portfolio.com, November 11, 2008. For a more detailed account, see Robin 
Blackburn, “The Subprime Crisis,” New Left Review 50, March-April, 2008, pp. 63-106. 
2 See SIFMA, ASF, ESF, AusSF and McKinsey & Company, “Restoring Confidence in the 
Securitisation Markets,” October 15, 2008, pp. 3-4. 
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Figure 2 
Stock Market Capitalization ($U.S. billion) 
www.bnarchives.net
 
NOTE: The vertical line marks the month of May 2007. The last 
data points are for October 2008.  
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: FINANUS(MV) for the 
U.S. FIRE sector; TOTMKUS(MV) for the U.S. market; and 
TOTMKWD(MV) for the world market).  
 
 
The gathering storm didn’t register immediately on the broader stock market. 
Figure 2 shows the market capitalization of three broad aggregates – U.S. FIRE equi-
ties, all U.S. equities, and all world equities. The three series are denominated in cur-
rent $U.S. and plotted on a logarithmic scale to facilitate comparison.3  
                                                 
3 A logarithmic scale has two convenient features. First, it amplifies the variations of a series 
when its values are small and compresses these variations when the values are large. This 
property enables us to conveniently examine exponential growth (note that the numbers on the 
scale jump by multiples of 10). It also allows us to compare series with very different orders of 
magnitudes (note that world market capitalization is 15 times larger than the market 
capitalization of the U.S. FIRE sector). Second, the slope of a series is indicative of its percent 
rate of change – the steeper the slope the greater the growth rate, and vice versa.  
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Figure 3 





NOTE: The vertical line marks the month of October 2007. The 
last data points are for October 2008. 
 
SOURCE: Conference Board through Global Insight (series 
code: JCOIN.M).  
 
 
The data show that, while the U.S. FIRE sector started to drop in May 2007 
(marked by the vertical line in the chart), the overall U.S. and global stock markets 
took another five months before tanking. However, once the broad reversal started, 
the downward convergence was swift. From October 2007 to October 2008, U.S. 
listed corporations lost 38% of their market capitalization, while the global market 
lost 46%. 
The last to join the downward spiral was the so-called “real economy.” Figure 3 
shows the U.S. Composite Index of Coincident Indicators, a weighted average of 
four indicators that move more or less together with the business cycle.4 Although 
                                                 
4 The four coincident indicators that make up the composite index include: (1) the number of 
employees on non-agricultural payroll (with an index weight of 52.9%), (2) personal income 
less transfers expressed in constant dollars (20.8%), (3) the level of industrial production 
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this Composite Index pertains only to the United States, in the current environment 
of global integration it provides a good proxy for world trends. 
The figure presents two manifestations of the index: one is the actual level; the 
other is the annual rate of change, calculated by comparing the same month in suc-
cessive years (so that the reading for October 2008 denotes the rate of change from 
October 2007, etc.). The growth series, plotted at the bottom of the chart, shows that 
the “real economy” started to decelerate at the end of 2006. But the actual level of 
the index, depicted by the top series, peaked at the end of 2007 (marked by the verti-
cal line in the figure) and started its month-to-month declines only in early 2008. 
So on the face of it, the world appears to be in the midst of a finance-led crisis, a 
decline triggered and significantly amplified by the collapse of fictitious capital. “The 
salient feature of the current financial crisis,” explains George Soros, “is that it was 
not caused by some external shock. . . . The crisis was generated by the financial sys-
tem itself.”5 According to this view, the biggest distortion was in the U.S. housing 
sector, whose bubble was the largest and first to deflate. The next victim was the 
broader financial market, which was also grossly inflated and therefore justly punc-
tured. And the last to capitulate was the “real economy,” whose excesses obviously 
were more limited yet certainly worthy of a periodic cleanup.  
But that is only half the story. 
 
Toward a New Upswing? 
 
The mismatch thesis tells us that fictitious capital, by its very nature, tends to distort 
the picture in both directions: it grows by too much in the upswing, only to shrink by 
too much in the downswing. And indeed, many experts are already wondering if 
finance hasn’t been overly deflated.  
Measured against the historical record, the current market collapse certainly is 
extremely large. The magnitude of this collapse is contextualized in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5, where we show the history of U.S. stock prices since 1820. Before examin-
ing these charts, though, note that they express stock prices not in actual dollars, but 
in constant dollars. The latter measure is computed by dividing actual stock prices 
(expressed as an index) by consumer prices (also expressed as an index). This com-
putation serves to “purge” from the stock market index the effect of inflation (and 
occasionally deflation). And once inflation has been expunged, the result represents 
stock prices denominated in constant dollars – i.e., in dollars with a “constant pur-
chasing power.”6  
                                                                                                                         
(14.7%), and (4) manufacturing and trade sales expressed in constant dollars (11.6%). (The 
meaning of “constant dollars” is explained later in the article.) 
5 George Soros, “The Crisis & What to Do About It,” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, 
No. 19, December.  
6 The notion of “constant dollars” is deeply problematic both theoretically and 
philosophically. But since we are dealing here with the conventional creed, we take this notion 
at face value. 
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Figure 4 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars 
www.bnarchives.net
 
NOTE: Grey areas indicate major bear markets. The U.S. stock 
price index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of 
bank, insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global 
Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s 
Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and 
the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant dollar series is 
computed by dividing the stock price index by the Consumer 
Price Index. The last data point is for 2008. 
  
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock 
prices; CPUSA for consumer prices); Standard and Poor’s 
through Global Insight (series codes: SP500@40.D7 and 
SP500.D7 for stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series 
code: L64@C111 for consumer prices). 
 
 
Why is it so important to distinguish between the two measures? To answer this 
question, note that stock prices in actual dollars can always be expressed as the prod-
uct of two separate magnitudes: (1) the average price level of all commodities (in 
actual dollars), and (2) the ratio between stock prices and the average price level 
(which yields a pure number). This decomposition is true by definition: 
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levelpriceaverage
pricesstock levelpriceaverage pricesstock ×=  
 
                      dollarsconstantinpricesstock levelpriceaverage ×=
 
Now, during periods of inflation or deflation, changes in the average price level 
(the first component on the right-hand side of the equation), can easily overwhelm 
changes that are unique to the stock market (the second component on the right). To 
illustrate, between 1900 and 2008, actual stock prices rose 133-fold. In terms of our 
equation, most of this increase was due to inflation: the average price level rose 
nearly 30-fold, whereas the ratio of stock prices to the average price level rose less 
than fivefold.7    
Clearly, stock owners are focused primarily on the second component. At the 
very minimum, their concern is not to keep up with inflation but to outperform it, and 
that is why we gauge the long-term performance of the stock market in constant dol-
lars rather than actual ones.8   
With this qualification in mind, let us return now to Figure 4. The chart shows 
the stock market index in constant prices, plotted against a logarithmic scale. The 
vertical grey bars indicate what we consider to be major bear markets – i.e., periods 
during which the stock market suffered protracted declines.  
As it turns out, there is no general definition for a bear market – let alone a “ma-
jor” one. So we’ve devised our own. In what follows we define a major bear market 
as a multiyear period during which stock prices, measured in constant dollars, move on a 
downtrend, and in which each successive peak is lower than the previous one.  
According to this definition, over the past two centuries, the United States ex-
perienced six major bear markets. These periods are listed in Table 2, along with the 
cumulative declines in stock prices.  
A similar picture emerges from Figure 5, which measures the annual growth rate 
of the stock market index (again, in constant dollars). The thin line in the chart 
shows the percent variation from year to year. The thick line smoothes these varia-
tions as a 10-year moving average – meaning that every observation in the series 
measures the average annual growth rate in the previous ten years.9  
                                                 
7 The computations here are based on data charted in Figure 4.  
8 Beating inflation is merely the beginning. For the modern investor, the ultimate goal is to 
beat the performance of other investors – i.e. to achieve differential accumulation. We hope to 
explore this latter emphasis in future articles in this series.   
9 To illustrate, the 10-year moving average for 2008 represents the average growth rate of the 
stock market index in the period 1999-2008, the 10-year moving average for 2007 represents 
the average for 1998-2007, and so on. 
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Table 2 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* 
(constant-dollar calculations) 
PERIOD 
DECLINE FROM PEAK  









* A major bear market is defined as a multi-
year period during which stock prices, meas-
ured in constant dollars, move on a down-
trend, and in which each successive peak is 
lower than the previous one. 
 
The last data points in Figure 5 are for 2008. The year-to-year change shows a 
drop of 40% – on par with the record declines of 1917, 1931, 1937 and 1974. Fur-
thermore, as the moving-average series indicates and Figure 4 confirms, this decline 
wasn’t a fluke event, but rather part of a decade-long bear market. According to the 
smoothed series, the market peaked in 1998, with the 10-year moving average 
growth rate hovering around 13%. From then on, annual growth rates decelerated, 
and by 2008 pushed the 10-year moving average down to nearly –4%. 
To the eyes of a seasoned financier, these magnitudes mean that the crisis may 
be approaching a bottom. According to Figure 5, prior crises were similarly bounded. 
Their highest starting point, measured by the 10-year moving average series, was 
13% (in 1929 and in 1959), and their lowest trough, measured by the same series, 
was –8% (in 1920). The extent of deceleration in growth rates, measured by the peak-
to-trough difference of the 10-year moving average, ranged from a low of 6.5% (dur-
ing in the 1834-1842 crisis), to a high of 15.5% (in 1928-1948).  
The present crisis, measured by the 10-year moving average series, has already 
met or exceeded these extreme values. It started from a record ceiling of 13.3%; its 
current low is –3.6%; and the extent of its deceleration, computed as the difference 
between these two values, marks a new record: 16.9%. For long-term investors, these 
numbers indicate that much of the crisis is probably behind them.  
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Figure 5 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars 
(annual growth rate) 
www.bnarchives.net
 
NOTE: The U.S. stock price index splices the following four sub-
series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock series 
weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the 
Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-
stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). 
The constant dollar series is computed by dividing the stock price 
index by the Consumer Price Index. The last data points are for 
2008. 
 
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock 
prices; CPUSA for consumer prices); Standard and Poor’s 
through Global Insight (series codes: SP500@40.D7 and 
SP500.D7 for stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series 
code: L64@C111 for consumer prices). 
 
 
And the news gets even better. According to Figure 4, historically, each major 
bear market was followed by a long bull run, and each of those bull runs pushed 
stocks to a new record high. These upswings occurred in 1842–1850, 1857–1905, 
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1920–1928, 1948–1968 and 1981–1999, and it isn’t far fetched to think that a new 
one may soon be brewing.  
Given that the present bear market is approaching historical lows, and since pre-
viously such bottoms were always followed by major upswings, many forward-
looking strategists – from permanent bull Barton Biggs, to Wizard of Omaha Warren 
Buffet, to doom-and-gloom Martin Wolf – are now advising their followers to fasten 
their seat belts.10 News from the so-called “real economy” is likely to remain very 
bad and may possibly get worse – but most of the negatives are already “in the 
price.” And since fictitious capital is notorious for “overreacting,” particularly during 
deep downturns, current stock prices offer a once-in-a-life-time buying opportunity 
for those prescient enough to see into the next takeoff. 
But, then, if the market has bottomed and the upswing is so certain, why isn’t 
every investor buying?  
 
Financial Cycles and the Reordering of Society 
 
It is easy to fall for the aesthetic gyrations of the stock market. Their stylized cycles 
make them look natural. They “revert to mean,” as Francis Galton would have it. 
They oscillate within fairly clear boundaries. Their ups and downs seem almost auto-
matic (at least in retrospect). Their regularities are so neat many are tempted to forget 
David Hume and extrapolate the past into the future. 
And here lies the problem. The long-term cycles of the stock market, no matter 
how stylized and regular they seem, are not self-generating. They don’t just happen 
on their own. Each cycle has a reason, and that reason is deeply social and histori-
cally unique.  
Note that, during the twentieth century, every oscillation from a bear to a bull market 
was accompanied by a systemic societal transformation: 
 
y The crisis of 1905–1920 marked the closing of the American Frontier, the shift 
from robber-baron capitalism to large-scale business enterprise and the beginning 
of synchronized finance. 
 
y The crisis of 1928–1948 signaled the end of “unregulated” capitalism and the 
emergence of large governments and the welfare-warfare state.  
  
y The crisis of 1968–1981 marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the resumption 
of worldwide capital flow and the onset of neoliberal globalization.  
 
                                                 
10 Barton Biggs, “The Mother of Bear Market Rallies is on the Horizon,” Financial Times, 
November 25, 2008, p. 24; Warren E. Buffett, “Buy American. I Am,” The New York Times, 
October 17, 2008; Martin Wolf, “Why Fairly Valued Stock Markets are an Opportunity,” 
Financial Times, November 26, 2008, p. 11. 






BICHLER AND NITZAN 
 
- 13 - 
 
 
Furthermore, none of these transformations were “in the cards.” Most observers 
in the 1900s didn’t expect managerial capitalism to take hold; few in the 1920s an-
ticipated the welfare-warfare state; and not too many in the 1960s predicted neolib-
eral regulation. All three transformations involved a complex set of conflicts, their 
trajectories were all fuzzy, and their outcomes were all but impossible to anticipate. 
In other words, underneath the seemingly repetitive long-term patterns of the 
market lies an open-ended and inherently unpredictable reordering of the entire politi-
cal economy. Although past bear markets have always given way to long bull runs, 
these transitions were never automatic. Each and every one of them reflected a pro-
found transformation of the underlying social structure. And in our view, this corre-
spondence still holds. In order for the current crisis to end and a new upswing to be-
gin, something very big has to happen: the social structure must change.  
The precise nature of this transformation – assuming it occurs – is likely to re-
main opaque until the process is well under way. But one thing seems clear enough. 
A new upswing means the rekindling of accumulation, and if we are to understand 
what this upswing might entail, we need to go back to the beginning and start from 
the entity that matters most: capital.  
For more on that issue, stay tuned for the next installment in our series. 
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